Alternatives to Custody in California: Home Detention, Work Release, Work Furlough, and Split Sentences

Three verbs run through these statutes, and the difference between them is the whole ballgame.

Recommend. Penal Code section 1203.016(e) provides that the court “may recommend or refer a person to the correctional administrator for consideration for placement in the home detention program,” and that “the recommendation or referral of the court shall be given great weight.” Section 1208(i) says the same for work furlough. Section 1203.017(e) says the same for the overcrowding home detention program. Section 3078(b) is deliberately weaker for county parole: the board “shall give careful consideration to such recommendation.”

Restrict or deny. Section 1203.016(e) also provides that “at the time of sentencing or at any time that the court deems it necessary, the court may restrict or deny the defendant’s participation in a home detention program.” Section 1208(b) is narrower and harsher: the work furlough administrator makes the fitness call “unless the court at the time of sentencing or committing has ordered that the person not be granted work furloughs.” That veto has to be exercised at sentencing. Section 3076(b) gives the court the same veto over county parole, but only as to a prisoner confined as a condition of probation upon conviction of a felony.

Order. The court cannot.

• People v. Superior Court (Hubbard) (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 287 (2d Dist., Div. 5). A sentencing judge ordered the probation department to place a DUI defendant on home monitoring. Peremptory writ granted. The court’s power under section 1203.016 is limited to recommending, referring, restricting, or denying, not ordering, placement. The opinion also holds that defendants serving mandatory minimum DUI sentences are not categorically excluded from home detention.
• People v. Superior Court (Peterson) (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 16 (4th Dist., Div. 1, review denied March 17, 1993). Closes the workaround. An order nominally placing the defendant in the sheriff’s custody while directing him to report to a non-contract work furlough facility was in excess of jurisdiction. The court read section 1208 by analogy to Hubbard: the sentencing court’s power is limited to recommending or precluding, not ordering, placement. Two arguments are foreclosed. Section 1203.1 does not help, because confinement in work furlough is outside the scope of a reasonable probation condition. And section 2900.5 merely affords credit for time served in certain alternative custody settings, without conferring any power to put a defendant there.
• In re Barber (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 368, 374 (2d Dist., Div. 3): “[A] court may not impose a work release program as a condition of probation; rather eligibility for the program and its administration are within the sheriff’s purview.” Drawing on Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 539. Note what Barber actually decides, because the quotable sentence is background rather than holding. Barber holds that section 4024.2 did not reach a petitioner whose jail term was a condition of probation and whose probation had already expired, and orders him released on that ground.
• Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 539. Worth knowing before you lean on it. Ryan is a judicial discipline case, and the point arrives through the judge’s want of statutory authority rather than through probation law. A judge may commit a person to a facility; the discretion to offer work release under section 4024.2 belongs to the official in charge of it.
• In re Thomas (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 721 (2d Dist., Div. 1). The outer bound on the sheriff’s side. Work furlough fitness rests solely in the administrator’s discretion and there is no federal due process right to admission, but under the state due process analysis of People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260 (plur. opn., Mosk, J., joined by two justices; four others wrote separately or concurred in the result), the administrator must give “advance notice to an applicant of a proposed rejection, the reason therefor, the specific concerns underlying the rationale for the rejection and of affording the applicant an opportunity to refute this reasoning” (Thomas, at p. 731). The Ramirez balancing test was later applied without dissent in In re Jackson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 501, an opinion issued by the court with four justices participating. Sections 1203.016(d)(2) and 1203.018(g)(2) now codify a version of Thomas, requiring written notice of specific reasons for denial or removal plus appeal rights established by program policy.
• In re Riley (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1162 (1st Dist., Div. 3): “We hold that persons enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time have a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without affording due process.” The court reasons by analogy to parolees and probationers, resting on Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 to 482 and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458. The trial court’s reliance on an unsupported finding that continued participation “was no longer feasible” did not survive review.

At sentencing. Do not ask the court to order home detention. Ask the court to refer, on the record and in the minute order, and to state that it recommends the defendant. That sentence has statutory weight under sections 1203.016(e) and 1208(i). Then walk the minute order to the sheriff’s program office yourself.

Watch the negative side. A prosecutor asking for “no alternatives to custody” language is asking for something with bite. San Diego’s CPAC unit lists “if the court has ordered or stipulated no CPAC, no Home Detention, no early release of any type, no alternatives to custody are authorized” as a flat disqualifier.

Subdivision (a) lets a county board of supervisors authorize the correctional administrator to offer home detention, in lieu of confinement, to inmates committed to county jail or another county correctional facility, to those granted probation, and to work furlough participants. The statute expressly reaches inmates who “may voluntarily participate or involuntarily be placed.” Subdivision (g) defines “correctional administrator” as the sheriff, the probation officer, or the director of the county department of corrections.

Conditions are in subdivision (b): remain inside the residence during designated hours; admit any probation officer or other peace officer designated by the correctional administrator, at any time, for compliance verification; agree to electronic monitoring, which may include GPS; and agree that the administrator may retake the participant without further order of the court if the equipment fails, if the participant leaves, or if the participant no longer meets criteria. Subdivision (c) permits warrantless retaking on reasonable cause.

Subdivision (d)(2) is the decision rule: the correctional administrator or designee “shall have the sole discretionary authority to permit program participation as an alternative to physical custody,” with written notice of specific reasons and appeal rights on denial or removal. Subdivision (d)(1) requires the rules and administrative policy to be written and reviewed annually by the board and the administrator, and “given to or made available to any participant upon request.” That is your public records hook.

Subdivision (e) is the court’s lever: recommend or refer, entitled to great weight; restrict or deny at sentencing or any time thereafter.

Subdivision (f) authorizes absences for employment, psychological counseling, educational or vocational classes, and medical and dental care, with willful failure to return punishable under section 4532.

Subdivision (i)(1) governs private operators. No public or private entity may run a home detention program without a written contract with the county’s correctional administrator. Relevant if a client is being offered monitoring by a vendor with no county contract.

No categorical offense exclusions appear in the statute. They are local, adopted under subdivision (d)(1).

And they are contestable. A categorical exclusion applied automatically, with no individualized review, is already unlawful under the California due process clause. In re Thomas (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 721 is that case: a Los Angeles County section 1208 applicant was automatically excluded because of the nature of his conviction, and the court found “a grievous risk of erroneous exclusion due to an infectious bias perilously bordering on a policy of automatic exclusion.” In re Head (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1125 (1st Dist., Div. 4) held separately that a blanket exclusion of a category of inmates “cannot constitute a reasonable exercise of discretion,” and set out five safeguards: a written statement of the grounds for exclusion, access to the information the decision-maker used, notice of the right to respond, an opportunity to respond orally to the responsible official, and a written final decision with reasons. Head concerned state prisoners under sections 6260 through 6265, where exclusion is statutorily conditioned, so cite it for reasonableness of discretion rather than for the process due at a county program. The related In re Head (1986) 42 Cal.3d 223 is the Supreme Court affirming the fee award.

Note that Thomas expressly finds no federal liberty interest, so the argument has to run through the California clause. What remains genuinely open is narrower than it first looks: whether a county may maintain a written offense-based presumption that it then applies case by case. Nothing published addresses that middle position.

Subdivision (a) sets the trigger: upon a determination by the correctional administrator that jail conditions require the release of sentenced misdemeanor inmates before full service of sentence due to lack of jail space, the board of supervisors may authorize a program under which inmates committed to county jail, granted probation, or participating in work furlough “may be required to participate in an involuntary home detention program, which shall include electronic monitoring.” One day of participation equals one day of incarceration, and participants receive the sentence reduction credits they would have received in custody.

Read the participant class carefully. The program is triggered by overcrowding requiring early release of sentenced misdemeanants, though the participant class as written is not textually confined to misdemeanants. “Sentenced misdemeanor inmates” appears in the triggering-determination clause; the class who may be required to participate is stated more broadly.

Subdivision (d)(2) gives the correctional administrator “the sole discretionary authority,” with written notice of reasons and appeal rights. Subdivision (e) carries the same court powers as section 1203.016(e): recommend or refer with great weight, restrict or deny.

Fees, and a correction worth carrying. Section 1203.017 has no subdivision (j), and an earlier version of this article quoted a no-fee sentence to it that does not appear anywhere in the section. Do not rely on section 1203.017 as a source of fee protection. It is not listed in section 1465.9(a) and not listed in section 1208.2(a)(1). Whatever fee protection exists for a 1203.017 participant has to be found elsewhere.

Note two asymmetries against section 1203.016. Section 1203.017 is not listed in section 2900.5(a), appearing only in (f). And it is not listed in section 4019(a), though subdivision (a) of 1203.017 supplies its own credit equivalence.

Orange County runs its Electronic Monitoring Program on section 1203.017 rather than 1203.016, and limits it to current misdemeanor charges. Confirm the operative statute before advising on eligibility or credits in any county.

Subdivision (a): “this section shall only apply to inmates being held in lieu of bail and on no other basis.”

Subdivision (c)(1) requires no holds and no outstanding warrants, plus one of three circumstances:

• (A) held at least 30 calendar days from arraignment pending disposition of only misdemeanor charges;
• (B) held at least 60 calendar days from arraignment pending disposition of charges; or
• (C) a determination by the correctional administrator that participation is consistent with the public safety interests of the community.

Those 30 and 60 day marks are the only statutory waiting periods in this area. Everything else about timing is county-local.

Subdivision (g)(2) gives the administrator “discretionary authority” (not the “sole discretionary authority” phrasing of sections 1203.016(d)(2) and 1203.017(d)(2)), with written notice of reasons and appeal rights on denial or removal. Subdivision (j)(2) defines “electronic monitoring program” to include home detention, work furlough, and work release programs. Subdivision (h) authorizes absences for employment, counseling, education, and medical care.

People v. Raygoza (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 593 (2d Dist., Div. 4) is the case to know. Presentence home confinement under a county electronic monitoring program established pursuant to section 1203.018 was custody entitling the defendant to credit under section 2900.5, even though he got there by a court-ordered bail reduction rather than by placement by the correctional administrator. The reasoning is equal protection: like defendants treated alike, punishment equalized for the same crimes.

Read the holding narrowly, though, because it is narrower than the sentence lawyers tend to quote. Raygoza turns on the program itself being an undisputed section 1203.018 program. It does not announce a free-standing “met the custodial conditions and standards” test detached from enrollment in one. Later authority asks whether the terms of pretrial release were as custodial or restraining as a statutory 1203.018 program, which is a showing you have to make rather than assume.

Subdivision (a)(1) makes the program operative only in counties where the board of supervisors has adopted an ordinance finding it feasible, separately as to employment, job training, and education. That ordinance designates the “work furlough administrator”: the sheriff, the probation officer, the director of the county department of corrections, or the superintendent of a county industrial farm or industrial road camp, one or more, separately or jointly.

Subdivision (a)(3) subjects private facilities to a written contract, Type IV minimum jail standards set by the BSCC, and personnel selection and training requirements, with a 60-day cure notice. Subdivision (a)(4) requires biennial BSCC inspection.

Subdivision (b) is the fitness provision and the court’s veto. The administrator decides fitness for continued employment, job training, or education, “unless the court at the time of sentencing or committing has ordered that the person not be granted work furloughs.” That clause appears three times, once for each category. Contrast subdivision (i), which gives a court recommendation or referral “great weight.” The court has a hard negative and a soft positive.

Subdivision (d)(1) requires confinement in the designated facility when not working, training, or being educated. Subdivision (d)(2) permits release up to 72 hours for medical, dental, or psychiatric care, a family emergency, pressing business, or reentry activities. Underused.

Subdivision (e) governs earnings: collection by the facility, employer duty to transmit, deductions for board, personal expenses, administration costs, and dependent support, with the balance paid at discharge. On priority, note the condition: the administrator’s claim takes priority only if the request for transmittal was made before levy, and where the sheriff serves as administrator and receives a writ first, the sheriff levies under the writ.

Subdivision (f): the prisoner “shall be eligible for time credits pursuant to Sections 4018 and 4019.” That cross-reference is how work furlough gets conduct credits despite not appearing in section 4019(a). In re Starr (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1550 (4th Dist., Div. 1) extends the same treatment to participants in privately owned and managed work furlough programs, on equal protection grounds.

Subdivision (g) lets the administrator order the balance served in actual confinement on a violation. Subdivision (h) makes willful failure to return punishable under section 4532.

Subdivision (j)(3) defines “employment” to include “care of children, including the daytime care of children of the prisoner.” Subdivision (j)(1) defines “education” to include vocational and educational training and counseling, plus psychological, drug abuse, alcohol, and other rehabilitative counseling.

People v. Superior Court (Peterson) (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 16 and In re Thomas (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 721 both arise here and are summarized in the “who decides” block above.

One open question on timing. Section 1208(b) anchors the court’s veto to “the time of sentencing or committing,” while section 1203.016(e) lets the court restrict or deny home detention “at any time that the court deems it necessary.” Nothing published construes that asymmetry, or says whether a 1208(b) order can be made later. Thomas quotes the language without reaching the point, and Peterson goes only to the court’s inability to order placement.

Section 4024.2. Subdivision (a): the board of supervisors may authorize the sheriff or other official in charge to offer a voluntary program in which one day of participation stands in for one day of confinement.

Subdivision (b)(1) lists permitted work: (A) manual labor on levees and public facilities including streets, parks, and schools; (B) manual labor for nonprofits, with the board obtaining workers’ compensation coverage under Labor Code section 3363.5; (C) graffiti cleanup and abatement; (D) weed and rubbish abatement; (E) house repairs and yard services for seniors and repairs to senior centers; (F) alternative public sector work for those unable to perform manual labor due to medical condition, physical disability, or age.

Subdivision (b)(2) is the sleeper provision. The sheriff “may permit a participant to receive work release credit for documented participation in educational programs, vocational programs, substance abuse programs, life skills programs, or parenting programs,” in lieu of labor, “with eight work-related hours to equal one day of custody credit.” For a client who cannot swing a shovel but can finish a curriculum, this is the argument.

Subdivision (b)(4)(A): hours are uniform for all persons committed to a facility in a county, and the hours may be determined by the sheriff consistent with the normal working hours of supervising county employees, each day being “a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 10 hours.”

Subdivision (c)(1): the participant signs a notice to appear and an agreement permitting immediate retaking for failure to appear, failure to perform, or ceasing to be a fit subject. Willful violation of the written promise to appear is a misdemeanor. Subdivision (c)(2): warrantless retaking requires a written order signed by the sheriff or program head describing the person with particularity, or the court may issue an arrest warrant.

Subdivision (d)(2): a person is eligible “only if the sheriff or other official in charge concludes that the person is a fit subject.” The court plays no role in the fitness determination itself, though subdivision (d)(1) lets the sheriff decline assignment where the record shows noncompliance with “any other order of the court.”

Section 4024.3 is the mandatory version. Where a county’s average daily inmate population reaches 90 percent of the correctional system’s mandated capacity, the board may authorize a program requiring participation in work release under the section 4024.2(b) criteria, with priority to volunteers. Mandated capacity is court-ordered capacity or Board of Corrections rated capacity, whichever is less. Subdivision (f) still contains express fee authority, discussed in the fee section below.

The credit question, and it runs against the client. People v. Wills (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1810 (3d Dist., review denied June 16, 1994) held a probationer got neither conduct nor work credit for work release time, because it was not time served in actual custody within section 4019(f).

Read the date. Wills construed section 4019 as it stood in 1994. Paragraph (a)(7) was added by Assembly Bill 2499 (Stats. 2014, ch. 612, § 6), effective January 1, 2015, and it now applies section 4019 “when a prisoner participates in a program pursuant to Section 1203.016 or Section 4024.2.” No published decision has addressed whether Wills survives that amendment, and Wills has never been disapproved. So treat the reading that work release is now inside section 4019 as an argument from the amended text, not settled law.

Three things sharpen the point.

• People v. Richter (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 575 (5th Dist.) follows Wills and extends it from conduct credit to custody credit: a probationer in a 4024.2 program is not in custody and gets no section 2900.5 credit. Richter also reasons that the Legislature put express credit authority in the mandatory work release statute, section 4024.3, and left it out of 4024.2, and treats the omission as deliberate. That is the strongest argument against your (a)(7) reading and you should be ready for it.
• People v. Silva (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 122 (3d Dist., review denied March 17, 2004) follows Wills but is not a work release case. It holds a defendant on post-conviction electronic home monitoring under section 1203.016 was not in actual custody for section 4019 purposes, because conduct credits exist to keep a custodial facility running. Cite it carefully: it is the pre-2015 authority the (a)(7) argument has to overcome on home detention as well as work release.
• People v. Anaya (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 608 cites Richter approvingly for the proposition that work release in lieu of confinement earns no custody credit.

Section 3074 is legislative findings only. Section 3075(a) establishes a board of parole commissioners in each county: (1) the sheriff or designee, or in a county with a department of corrections, the director; (2) the probation officer or designee; (3) a member “not a public official,” selected from the public by the presiding judge of the superior court. Subdivision (b) sets that public member’s term at one year, in no event exceeding three consecutive years, with expenses and any per diem the board of supervisors sets.

Section 3076(a) is a single sentence authorizing the board to make and enforce rules. Everything operative is in subdivision (b), which requires action at regularly called meetings with two-thirds of members present, and adoption of written rules and reasons under which a prisoner confined in a county or city jail, work furlough facility, industrial farm, or road camp, under judgment or as a condition of probation, “may be allowed to go upon parole outside,” remaining in the board’s legal custody and subject to be retaken at any time. The court’s veto is embedded in the same sentence and it is narrow: “unless the court at the time of committing has ordered that such prisoner confined as a condition of probation upon conviction of a felony not be granted parole.”

Subdivision (c) requires complete rules to go to every superior court judge, and eligibility sections plus a contact name and phone to the persons in charge of county correctional facilities, posted or given to each prisoner. Another public records hook.

Section 3077 gives jurisdiction to grant parole only to the sentencing county where the prisoner is incarcerated elsewhere. Section 3078(a) imposes the duty to notify the sentencing judge of an application. Section 3078(b) provides that the judge may make a recommendation to which the board “shall give careful consideration.”

Note the drafting difference from sections 1203.016(e), 1203.017(e), and 1208(i), all of which say “great weight.” Nothing published compares the two standards. Do not expect help from the state parole line either. Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 and Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192 are all section 3041 and the some evidence standard of review, a different scheme, and none of them mentions section 3078(b).

No eligibility fraction or minimum-time-served requirement appears in Article 3.5, sections 3074 through 3083. Eligibility timing is delegated to each board’s written rules under section 3076(b). Section 3081 does contain a three-year maximum parole term, so the article is not silent on numbers generally. San Diego requires half the sentence served before application, and that comes from the county’s rules, not the Penal Code.

County parole is listed in section 1208.2(a)(1), so the fee prohibition reaches it.

Administered jointly by CAL FIRE and CDCR, drawing from county jail populations in participating counties. San Diego requires a section 1170(h) sentence and current sheriff’s custody, screened on a voluntary basis by Incarcerated Person Request form (J-20) to the Detentions Processing Division. San Bernardino operates a county inmate fire camp out of Glen Helen with three 14-man crews. Los Angeles’s route is AB 109 only and the numbers are negligible. No other county in a nine-county survey publishes a county fire camp program.

Note that a section 1170(h) sentence, which qualifies for San Diego fire camp, is a categorical disqualifier for that same county’s home detention and work furlough programs. Worth knowing before you pick a lane at sentencing.

Threshold. Section 1170(h)(1) and (2) set the county jail felony terms. Subdivision (h)(3) has four subparagraphs carrying five disqualifiers, because (A) carries two of them: (A) a prior or current serious felony under section 1192.7(c) or a prior or current violent felony under section 667.5(c); (B) a qualifying out-of-state prior; (C) a section 290 registration requirement; or (D) a section 186.11 aggravated white collar enhancement imposed as part of the sentence. Section 1170(f) makes an allegation of prison eligibility non-dismissable under section 1385, a bar that section 1170(f) states expressly “for purposes of paragraph (3) of subdivision (h)” and that is therefore not freestanding. Subdivision (h)(4) preserves pretrial diversion, deferred entry of judgment, and probation under section 1203.1.

The presumption. Section 1170(h)(5)(A): “Unless the court finds, in the interest of justice, that it is not appropriate in a particular case, the court, when imposing a sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2), shall suspend execution of a concluding portion of the term for a period selected at the court’s discretion.”

Rule 4.415(a) states it expressly: “Because section 1170(h)(5)(A) establishes a statutory presumption in favor of the imposition of a period of mandatory supervision in all applicable cases, denials of a period of mandatory supervision should be limited.”

Rule 4.415(b) requires in its introductory sentence that the determination “must be based on factors that are specific to a particular case or defendant,” then supplies four non-exclusive illustrative factors introduced by “Factors the court may consider include”: the balance of custody exposure remaining after presentence credits; present status on probation, mandatory supervision, PRCS, or parole; case-specific factors indicating a lack of need for supervision on release; and whether the nature, seriousness, or circumstances of the case, or past performance on supervision, substantially outweigh the benefits of supervision. The mandate is in the preamble; (b)(1) through (b)(4) are permissive.

Rule 4.415(c) lists nine factors affecting length and conditions, and directs at (c)(7) “[c]onsideration of the statutory accrual of post-sentence custody credits for mandatory supervision under section 1170(h)(5)(B) and sentences served in county jail under section 4019(a)(6).” Rule 4.415(d) requires the court to state its reasons on the record when denying in the interests of justice, notwithstanding rule 4.412(a).

Credits. Section 1170(h)(5)(B): unless in actual custody related to the sentence, the defendant “shall be entitled to only actual time credit” during mandatory supervision. No section 4019 conduct credits on the tail. Time suspended because the defendant absconded is not credited. A defendant subject to search as a condition of mandatory supervision is subject to search or seizure “only by a probation officer or other peace officer.”

Sequencing. Section 1170(h)(5)(B) provides that mandatory supervision commences on release from physical custody “or an alternative custody program, whichever is later.” The only place the Legislature expressly stacked alternative custody against supervision.

Term and revocation. The period is mandatory and may not be terminated early except by court order. Revocation and modification proceed under sections 1203.2(a) and (b) or 1203.3.

Definition for a brief: People v. Avignone (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1233, 1240 (4th Dist., Div. 1). The opinion is certified for partial publication, with parts I, III and IV unpublished, and the definition sits in published part II: “A split sentence is a hybrid sentence in which a trial court suspends execution of a portion of the term and releases the defendant into the community under the mandatory supervision of the county probation department.” Its published holding is that the court had no authority to strike the section 186.11 enhancement allegations, which made the split sentences unauthorized.

Section 1170 was amended effective January 1, 2026 by SB 551, but the amendment rewrote the hortatory findings in subdivision (a)(1) only. Subdivisions (h)(1), (h)(3), and (h)(5) are unchanged.

Subdivision (a) frames the discretion. Eligibility, subdivision (b): (b)(1) a DSM diagnosis, excluding antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia, with defense evidence including diagnosis or treatment within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert; (b)(2) the disorder was a significant factor in the offense, and the court “shall find” significance “unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor.” On amendment history, the operative pre-AB 46 text is the product of AB 1412 (Stats. 2023, ch. 687, § 1.2), operative July 1, 2024; SB 159 (Stats. 2024, ch. 40, § 30); and SB 1323 (Stats. 2024, ch. 646, § 1) together with SB 1400 (Stats. 2024, ch. 647, § 1.5), both effective January 1, 2025.

Suitability, subdivision (c): (c)(1) expert opinion that symptoms would respond to treatment; (c)(2) consent and speedy trial waiver, or the competency-proceeding alternative; (c)(3) agreement to comply; (c)(4) no unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18.

Exclusions, subdivision (d), eight items: murder or voluntary manslaughter; any offense requiring section 290 registration except section 314; rape; lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14; section 220; section 264.1; section 288.5; section 11418(b) or (c).

Period: two years felony, one year misdemeanor. The time limits sit in the definition of “pretrial diversion” at section 1001.36(f)(1)(C), not in (b), (c), or (h). Disposition, (h): dismissal on satisfactory performance, arrest deemed never to have occurred, record access restricted under section 1001.9, subject to the peace officer carve-outs in (j). Subdivision (m), operative July 1, 2024, is the firearm prohibition procedure.

Timing: diversion may be sought at any point from the filing of charges until adjudication.

Case law.

• People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1 (4th Dist., Div. 1) applies SB 1223’s amendments retroactively to cases not final as of January 1, 2023, on the Frahs framework, and remands for a new hearing under the amended statute. The effective date comes from the bill; the opinion does not recite it.
• People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485 (4th Dist., Div. 1) holds a post-offense diagnosis qualifies. The reasoning is worth having: the five-year window in (b)(1) runs backward from the filing of the diversion request, not from the offense, and a trial court may not substitute a timing rule the Legislature did not enact. Harlow’s diagnosis came two months before the motion and three years after the crime.
• Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124 (2d Dist., Div. 7) granted a writ of mandate where substantial evidence did not support the finding that the defendant was unsuitable and the court’s use of its residual discretion was inconsistent with the purposes of the statute. Note the relief. It vacated the denial and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. It did not direct a grant of diversion.
• People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439 (2d Dist., Div. 7) holds it is an abuse of discretion to find a defendant unsuitable based on the violent nature of the charged crime, violence not being a listed eligibility or suitability factor under subdivisions (b) and (c). A court may weigh the circumstances of the offense on whether the disorder was a significant factor, and on super-strike risk, but it may not use residual discretion to redefine public safety against the Legislature’s intent. Two further holdings are useful and less quoted: it was also an abuse of discretion to deny diversion and require the defendant to plead no contest to get the treatment he needed, and the court improperly considered whether a two-year program would be long enough. Tourville builds on Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 896 and Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671 on the limits of residual discretion.

Pending change. AB 46 (Stats. 2026, ch. 18), chaptered June 29, 2026, substantially rewrites section 1001.36 and appears to take effect January 1, 2027. Among other things it would narrow the (b)(2) presumption to a diagnosis within five years of the current offense, replace the section 1170.18 dangerousness standard with “a substantial and undue risk to the physical safety of another person,” require the court to state reasons for denial orally on the record, and revise the expert-opinion criterion from whether symptoms “would respond to mental health treatment” to whether the proposed diversion plan is clinically appropriate to address the symptoms that caused, contributed to, or motivated the charged offense.

Three cautions, and the third is new. The January 1, 2027 operative date has not been confirmed from the chaptered bill; AB 46 may already be operative, and section 1001.36’s own history contains a June 29, 2024 immediate-effect chapter. The post-AB 46 subdivision map has not been retrieved, so do not rely on post-amendment subdivision letters from any source until you pull the chaptered text. And a Westlaw check on 2026-07-30 returned no record of AB 46 as Stats. 2026, ch. 18 at all, so the chapter number itself is unconfirmed. Verify the whole thing against leginfo or the Secretary of State’s enrolled bill records before you file anything that turns on it.

Subdivision (a) covers misdemeanors and felonies not listed in subdivision (o). Misdemeanors, (b): current or former U.S. military membership, plus that the defendant “may be suffering” from sexual trauma, TBI, PTSD, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of service. No causation showing.

Felonies, (c): adds that the condition resulted from service and “was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense,” with the same clear and convincing presumption as section 1001.36(b)(2).

Subdivision (n)(1) is the DUI provision: “Notwithstanding any other law, including Section 23640 of the Vehicle Code,” an eligible offense includes a misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 23152 or 23153, preserving DMV administrative action. Subdivision (n)(2) excludes any other DUI-related offense.

Period, (j): two years, with progress reports at least every six months. Disposition, (e) and (k): dismissal on satisfactory performance, arrest deemed never to have occurred, no use to deny employment, benefit, license, or certificate, subject to the peace officer carve-out in (l).

Subdivision (f) requires coordinated referral to the county veterans service officer. Subdivision (h) requires preference for programs with a history of successfully treating veterans, “including programs operated by the United States Department of Defense or the United States Department of Veterans Affairs.”

Exclusions, subdivision (o): the same eight-item list as section 1001.36(d).

Section 1000 / 1000.1 (drug pretrial diversion). Section 1000(a) lists qualifying offenses (Health & Saf. Code sections 11350, 11357, 11364, 11365, 11375(b)(2), 11377, 11550; Veh. Code section 23222(b); Health & Saf. Code section 11357; section 11358 for personal use cannabis; section 11368 fictitious prescription for personal use; Pen. Code sections 653f(d), 381, 647(f) if under the influence; Bus. & Prof. Code section 4060) and four eligibility criteria: no controlled substance conviction within five years other than a listed offense; no crime of violence or threatened violence; no contemporaneous non-listed narcotics violation; no prior felony within five years. Subdivision (b) requires the prosecutor to file a written declaration or state grounds on the record on eligibility or ineligibility, and is expressly intended to allow the diversion hearing to be set at arraignment. Sole remedy for an ineligibility finding is postconviction appeal.

Since AB 208 (Stats. 2017, ch. 778, operative January 1, 2018) this is true pretrial diversion, not deferred entry of judgment. The defendant pleads not guilty, waives speedy trial, speedy preliminary hearing, and jury trial. Section 1000.1(d): participation “shall not constitute a conviction or an admission of guilt for any purpose.” Section 1000.2(c): no less than 12 and no more than 18 months, with a mandatory good cause extension on the defendant’s request. Section 1000.4(a): arrest deemed never to have occurred; court may order sealing under section 851.92; Bus. & Prof. Code section 492 preserves professional licensing discipline.

Section 1001.95 (judicial misdemeanor diversion). Subdivision (a): a judge may offer diversion “at the judge’s discretion, and over the objection of a prosecuting attorney.” Subdivision (b): continuance “not to exceed 24 months.” Subdivision (c): dismissal on compliance.

Subdivision (e) currently has three exclusions, not four: (1) any offense requiring section 290 registration; (2) “any offense involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code or subdivision (b) of Section 13700 of this code”; (3) section 646.9. The frequently recited four-item list (sections 290, 273.5, 243(e), 646.9) reflects the pre-2022 version, superseded by AB 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58), which is the only amendment to section 1001.95 since its enactment by AB 3234 (Stats. 2020, ch. 334). AB 200 collapsed the two named DV offenses into a single broader categorical exclusion. Many firm pages still recite the superseded list. Vehicle Code section 23640 independently bars DUI. Completion requirements are in section 1001.96; record relief in section 1001.97.

Section 1170.9 (veterans). Subdivision (a) requires the court, before sentencing, to determine military service and whether the defendant may be suffering from sexual trauma, TBI, PTSD, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of service. Subdivision (b)(1): if so and if otherwise eligible for probation, the court “shall consider the circumstances described in subdivision (a) as a factor in favor of granting probation.” Subdivision (b)(2) authorizes an order into a local, state, federal, or private nonprofit treatment program for a period not exceeding the term otherwise served, provided the defendant agrees to participate and the court finds an appropriate program exists. Subdivision (e): sentence credits for actual time served in residential treatment. Subdivision (f): preference for programs with a history of successfully treating veterans. Subdivision (h): restorative relief after a noticed hearing on not less than 15 days’ notice, including early termination, section 17(b) reduction, and section 1203.4 relief. Subdivision (h)(4)(B) is the eight-category exceptions list, not the relief menu.

Section 1203.44 (Hope California), added by AB 1360 (Stats. 2023, ch. 685) effective January 1, 2024 and repealed July 1, 2029 unless extended (§ 1203.44(k)). It is post-conviction rather than diversionary: the defendant elects it upon pronouncement of a jail or prison sentence. A Sacramento and Yolo County pilot offering voluntary secured residential treatment in lieu of a jail or prison sentence for drug-motivated felonies. Subdivision (b)(2) excludes nonviolent drug possession offenses under section 1210(a). The court must find the decision knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Duration is set by the treatment providers’ recommendation and may not exceed the term otherwise imposed, excluding enhancements. Section 4019 credits apply. And the statute is explicit that “the court shall not place the defendant on probation for the underlying offense.”

The Treatment-Mandated Felony Act, Health and Safety Code section 11395, created by Proposition 36 of 2024, effective December 18, 2024. Sections 11396 and 11397 do not exist. Subdivision (c): triggered by two or more prior convictions, felony or misdemeanor, from an enumerated list of drug offenses, including convictions predating the effective date, with no washout; priors must be pled and either admitted or found true. Subdivision (b): possession of a hard drug without a prescription by such a person is punishable either by up to one year in county jail or as a felony under Penal Code section 1170(h), and (b)(2) bars a jail or prison sentence unless the court finds the person not eligible or not suitable for treatment or a (d)(4) failure circumstance applies. Subdivision (e) defines “hard drug” to include fentanyl, heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, methamphetamine, and PCP, and excludes cannabis, peyote, and LSD.

Subdivision (d)(1) is a deferred entry of judgment structure: the defendant elects treatment by pleading guilty or no contest, admitting the priors, waiving time, and agreeing to a court-approved program, and that plea “shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose unless judgment is entered pursuant to paragraph (4)” (§ 11395(d)(1)(A)). Subdivision (d)(3): dismissal on completion, with section 1000.4 applying. Subdivision (d)(5): actual credits only under section 2900.5 for residential treatment; no section 4019 conduct credits; no credit at all for outpatient treatment or counseling.

Caution on section 1210.1. The version printed in most sources reflects SB 1137 (2006). In Gardner v. Schwarzenegger (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1366 (1st Dist., Div. 1) the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment declaring SB 1137 invalid in its entirety and enjoining its enforcement, non-severably by operation of SB 1137’s own section 9, which required the whole measure to go to a popular vote if any provision were invalidated. The operative text of section 1210.1 is therefore the pre-2006 initiative version. Be warned: commercial and mirror code text still prints the enjoined SB 1137 version, showing a January 1, 2012 effective date, listing Stats. 2006, ch. 63 in its credits, and carrying flash-incarceration sanctions in subdivision (f) that are legally inoperative. People v. Barros (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1581 confirms Gardner and says as much out loud, noting that SB 1137’s amendments remain in the annotated codes while being legally invalid. Resolve that before citing subdivision letters.

Section 2900.5(a) credits all days of custody, expressly including time in a jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, or similar residential institution, and “days served in home detention pursuant to Section 1203.016 or 1203.018.” Section 1203.017 is absent from the (a) list.

Section 2900.5(f) is the mandatory minimum provision: time in a camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, or “home detention program pursuant to Section 1203.016, 1203.017, or 1203.018,” in lieu of county jail, “shall qualify as mandatory time in jail.” Hubbard holds that defendants serving mandatory minimum DUI sentences are not categorically excluded from these programs.

Section 2900.5(g) is the trap: the section “does not authorize the sentencing of convicted offenders to any of the facilities or programs mentioned herein.” A credit statute, not placement authority. Peterson said so directly.

Section 4019. Subdivision (b) deducts one day per four-day period unless the record shows the prisoner refused to satisfactorily perform assigned labor, and subdivision (c) deducts one more unless the record shows failure to comply with reasonable rules. Note the direction: these are refusal-triggered forfeitures, not affirmative earnings, and the record burden runs the other way. Subdivision (d) is not a credit provision at all; it says the section does not require the sheriff to assign labor where the record shows refusal. Subdivision (e) means nothing accrues on a commitment shorter than four days. Subdivision (f) states the legislative intent: “if all days are earned under this section, a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody.” Note the conditional.

Subdivision (a)(7) applies section 4019 “when a prisoner participates in a program pursuant to Section 1203.016 or Section 4024.2,” prospectively except for those deemed eligible under 1203.016 before January 1, 2015. Sections 1203.017, 1203.018, 4024.3, and 1208 are not on the (a) list; work furlough arrives via the cross-reference in section 1208(f).

The cases.

• In re Starr (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1550 (4th Dist., Div. 1): participants in privately owned and managed work furlough programs get section 4019 conduct credits the same as participants in county-sponsored public programs. Equal protection reasoning.
• People v. Wills (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1810 (3d Dist., review denied June 16, 1994): neither conduct nor work credit for work release time, as not time served in actual custody under section 4019(f). Construed section 4019 before paragraph (a)(7) was added by AB 2499 (Stats. 2014, ch. 612, § 6), effective January 1, 2015. Wills has never been disapproved.
• People v. Richter (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 575 (5th Dist.): follows Wills and extends it from conduct credit to custody credit under section 2900.5. Also reasons that express credit authority appears in section 4024.3 and not in 4024.2, and that the omission was deliberate.
• People v. Silva (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 122 (3d Dist.): follows Wills, but on post-conviction electronic home monitoring under section 1203.016 rather than work release. Conduct credits exist to keep a custodial facility running, so they have no application where the defendant is not in actual custody in a section 4019(a)(1) facility.
• People v. Anaya (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 608: cites Richter approvingly on work release earning no custody credit.
• People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91 (1st Dist., Div. 2): an equal protection holding. Pretrial and post-judgment electronic home monitoring detainees are similarly situated for conduct credit, and no rational basis supports treating them differently, so a defendant on pretrial home detention as a condition of a bail reduction could not be denied credits available to post-judgment section 1203.016 participants. The comparison is framed through subdivision (a)(4), covering custody after arrest and before sentence, rather than (a)(7). People v. Orellana (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 319 distinguishes Yanez as inapplicable in a different context.
• People v. Raygoza (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 593 (2d Dist., Div. 4): see the section 1203.018 block above. Credit is owed where the defendant was in fact enrolled in a program established pursuant to section 1203.018, regardless of whether the correctional administrator or the court put him there. Read as narrowly as the opinion is written.

So the state of play on work release credits is this. Section 4019(a)(7) names section 4024.2 in terms. But no published decision addresses whether Wills survives the amendment, Wills has never been disapproved, and Richter and Anaya both sit on the other side with a deliberate-omission argument drawn from section 4024.3. Argue the amended text if you like it, and say plainly that it is an argument.

Mandatory supervision: section 1170(h)(5)(B), actual time credit only, and rule 4.415(c)(7) makes the court weigh that differential.

Version note: the current section 4019 is repealed as of January 1, 2028. The current text comes from Stats. 2023, ch. 685 (AB 1360), § 3. A successor version is said to become operative on the repeal date, but that rests on an editorial cross-reference and its text has not been retrieved, so do not rely on any description of its content. Cite deliberately in anything with a long shelf life.

There is no statutory deadline to apply. Sections 1203.016, 1203.017, 1208, 4024.2, and 3076 are all silent on when a referral must be made or an application filed. The only statutory clocks are the 30 and 60 day waiting periods in section 1203.018(c)(1), the section 1208(d)(2) 72-hour absence, the section 4024.2(b)(4)(A) 8 to 10 hour day, the section 4024.2(b)(2) 8-hours-to-one-day conversion, and the section 4019(e) four-day floor.

The court’s timing constraints run the other way. Section 1208(b) requires the work furlough veto to be exercised “at the time of sentencing or committing.” Section 3076(b) requires the county parole veto “at the time of committing.” Section 1203.016(e), by contrast, lets the court restrict or deny “at the time of sentencing or at any time that the court deems it necessary.” If you want to preserve the option, watch what goes into the minutes at sentencing on work furlough and county parole in particular, because those windows close.

San Diego prescreen mechanics. CPAC accepts pre-sentencing application reviews if approved by a San Diego Superior Court judge. The defendant must be pre-sentenced, with a probation hearing and a sentencing date 14 or more business days from approval of the request. CPAC then submits a letter to the court indicating denial or provisional approval. Form J-142, emailed to cpac@sdsheriff.org or faxed. Cohabitant acknowledgement is form J-144. Rules and regulations are form J-148.

Documented county lead times: San Diego, 14 business days before the report date. Sacramento, 5 days from sentencing, background up to 8 weeks. Kern, 5 days to open a file after referral plus 5 days for the compliance deputy. Fresno, 5 days from the court date for the work furlough interview, and an “enroll by” date on the minute order for the work program. Los Angeles, internal screening 90 to 180 days before the release date, nothing public-facing.

Sentencing checklist on timing. Request a surrender date that clears the county lead time by a margin. Get the referral and the recommendation into the minute order, not just the transcript. Where a prescreen exists, ask for judicial authorization at the hearing before sentencing, not at sentencing.

AB 1869 (Stats. 2020, ch. 92), effective July 1, 2021, repealed the fee authority that then sat in sections 1203.016, 1203.018, 1208.2, and 4024.2, among others. Section 1465.9(a) makes outstanding balances under those sections, as they read on June 30, 2021, “unenforceable and uncollectible.”

AB 177 (Stats. 2021, ch. 257) repealed a different set of costs, enumerated in Penal Code section 1465.9(b). That subdivision lists section 1203.1ab (home detention program costs), section 1203.1m (work furlough program costs), and section 1203.1c (jail-alternative work program costs), so AB 177 does bear on this area and should not be waved off.

Section 1208.2 is the load-bearing provision, and it came from AB 1869, not AB 199. Section 1208.2 was added by AB 1869 (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 58), operative July 1, 2021, and it states an affirmative prohibition rather than a bare repeal. AB 199 (Stats. 2022, ch. 57, § 17) later amended it, effective June 30, 2022. A board of supervisors implementing the programs listed in subdivision (a)(1) “shall not impose a program administrative fee.” That list reaches work furlough under section 1208, electronic home detention under sections 1203.016 and 1203.018, and county parole under Article 3.5, but not section 1203.017. Privately operated home detention and work furlough programs “shall not impose program administrative fees or application fees” either, and the program administrator must ensure the prohibition is contained in any contractual agreement.

The private vendor workaround is therefore closed for home detention, work furlough, and county parole.

Three gaps remain, and they explain where the surviving fees cluster.

• Section 4024.2 (work release) is not in the section 1208.2(a)(1) list. The argument against work release fees rests on repeal of authority plus section 1465.9 rather than an express prohibition.
• Section 4024.3(f) still contains live fee authority. The board “may prescribe a program administrative fee, not to exceed the pro rata cost of administration, to be paid by each person according to his or her ability to pay.” Section 4024.3 was not amended by AB 1869, is not in section 1465.9(a), and is not in section 1208.2(a)(1). Note the contrast: section 4024.2 is listed in section 1465.9(a), so court-imposed costs under the voluntary work release statute as it read on June 30, 2021 are unenforceable and uncollectible. Do not treat voluntary and mandatory work release fees alike.
• Section 1203.017 is not covered at all. It appears nowhere in section 1208.2(a)(1), (b)(2), or (c), and it is not in section 1465.9(a). Do not tell a section 1203.017 participant that section 1208.2 bars their fees.

Counties still publishing a fee. Orange County, $90 administrative fee for the Community Work Program and nothing for electronic monitoring. Riverside, $90 for the Work Release Program. San Bernardino, $15 per day for work release, inability to pay not disqualifying. San Luis Obispo, $75 application plus $30 per day for home detention and $14 per day for alternative work. The San Luis Obispo home detention figure is squarely inside the section 1208.2(a)(1) list and is the hardest to defend.

Section 4532 treats home detention as confinement. A participant in a section 1203.016, 1203.017, or 1203.018 program who escapes from the place of confinement is covered.

• Subdivision (a)(1), misdemeanor-underlying: escape or attempted escape is a felony, and if not by force or violence, punishable by a determinate term of one year and one day in state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year. The branches are disjunctive.
• Subdivision (a)(2), by force or violence: two, four, or six years, consecutive, or county jail up to one year.
• Subdivision (b)(1), felony-underlying, non-forcible: “16 months, two years, or three years, to be served consecutively, or in a county jail not exceeding one year.” Note a textual asymmetry in (b)(1): its escape clause names only section 1203.016 while its participation clause lists all three home detention statutes. Nothing published construes it, and it is worth knowing how invisible the point is. People v. Taggart (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 607 and People v. Allen (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1 both quote the participation clause with all three statutes in it, and People v. Potts (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1167 handles a 1203.016 escape under subdivision (e), and none of the three notices the mismatch. It does not appear in section 4532(a)(1), which lists all three in both clauses. Do not assert a consequence from it.
• Subdivision (b)(2), by force or violence: two, four, or six years, full-term consecutive, not subject to section 1170.1(a) reduction.
• Subdivision (a)(3): a conviction under subdivision (a), or under (b) involving a home detention participant under sections 1203.016, 1203.017, or 1203.018 not committed by force or violence, “shall not be charged as a prior felony conviction in any subsequent prosecution.”
• Subdivision (e) is the one that catches people: willful failure to return on time from an authorized absence “is an escape from that place of confinement,” expressly reaching Cobey work furlough under section 1208, section 4018.6 temporary release, and all three home detention statutes.
• Subdivision (c): escape from an alternative custody program under section 1170.05 is a misdemeanor. The one lenient category.
• Subdivision (d) carries a presumption against probation for felony escape from a secure main jail facility, a court building, or transport between them, and subdivision (d)(3) excludes a work furlough facility from the definition of “main jail facility.”

Removal. Sections 1203.016(b)(4) and (c) permit the administrator to retake without further order of the court and permit warrantless retaking on reasonable cause. Section 4024.2(c)(2) requires a written order signed by the sheriff or program head describing the person with particularity for a warrantless retaking, or a court arrest warrant. Sections 1203.016(d)(2) and 1203.018(g)(2) require written notice of the specific reasons for a denial or removal, including appeal rights established by program administrative policy. Section 1208(g) lets the work furlough administrator order the balance served in actual confinement on a violation.

In re Riley (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1162 (1st Dist., Div. 3) adds a court-side limit: “persons enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time have a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without affording due process,” resting on Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 to 482 and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458, and an unsupported finding that participation “was no longer feasible” will not carry a revocation.

Contrast In re Thomas, which governs initial exclusion and leaves fitness to the administrator. Nothing published reconciles the two frameworks, and In re Barber (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 368 is the cite for that gap: it expressly declined to reach the question, saying it had no occasion to address what process is due to a person who absconds from a work release program and whose probation has not expired.

1. Before the plea, run diversion first. Sections 1001.36, 1001.80, 1000, 1001.95, 1170.9. A dismissal beats the best custody alternative.
2. Check section 1170(h)(3) on felony cases. A serious or violent prior, a section 290 registration requirement, or a section 186.11 enhancement sends the case to state prison and takes county alternatives off the table entirely.
3. Request a prescreen where the county offers one. San Diego does, with judicial authorization, if sentencing is at least 14 business days out. A provisional approval letter changes the sentencing conversation.
4. Ask for a surrender date that clears the county lead time. Work backward from the report date, not forward from the hearing.
5. Get the referral in the minute order. Cite section 1203.016(e) or 1208(i) and ask the court to state that its referral is entitled to great weight.
6. Watch the work furlough window. Section 1208(b) ties the court’s veto to the time of sentencing or committing, while section 1203.016(e) lets the court restrict or deny “at any time that the court deems it necessary.” No published decision addresses whether a section 1208(b) order can be made after sentencing, so treat the difference as a textual argument, not a settled rule.
7. Watch for adverse minute order language. “No alternatives to custody” is a disqualifier in most counties and hard to undo.
8. On a section 1170(h) case, ask for the split. Put rule 4.415(a) in front of the court. Denials “should be limited,” and rule 4.415(d) requires reasons on the record.
9. Do the credit math before recommending work release. Section 4019(a)(7) names section 4024.2, but Wills has never been disapproved, no published decision addresses whether it survives the 2015 amendment, and Richter and Anaya cut the other way. Treat the credit argument as unsettled.
10. If the client cannot do manual labor, cite section 4024.2(b)(2). Eight hours of a treatment, life skills, or parenting program equals one day of credit.
11. On a mandatory minimum, cite section 2900.5(f). Home detention qualifies as mandatory time in jail.
12. If a fee is demanded for home detention, work furlough, or county parole, read section 1208.2 (added by AB 1869, later amended by AB 199). Note that section 1203.017 is outside that prohibition.
13. Warn the client about section 4532(e). Coming back late from an authorized absence is escape, and escape from home detention is a felony.
14. Request the county’s written program rules. Sections 1203.016(d)(1) and 3076(c) both require them to exist and be made available.