Pulling the Time Waiver: What the New Clock Actually Gives You, and the Ten Days It Does Not

Every defense lawyer has had this conversation. The client has been waiving time for eight months, something changes, and now they want their trial. So you stand up and pull the waiver. The clock that starts running is not the clock your client had before they waived, and it is not a clock the judge gets to set. Penal Code section 1382 sets the number, the withdrawal itself starts it, and the judge’s only job that morning is to pick a date inside it and tell everyone what the date is.

That is the easy part. The part that costs cases is what the new period does not come with.

What the statute does on withdrawal

Section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(A) covers felonies. A general waiver lets the superior court set or continue a trial date without the sanction of dismissal. Then this: “If the defendant, after proper notice to all parties, later withdraws, in open court, his or her waiver in the superior court, the defendant shall be brought to trial within 60 days of the date of that withdrawal.” The next sentence makes the setting mandatory. “Upon the withdrawal of a general time waiver in open court, a trial date shall be set and all parties shall be properly notified of that date.”

Subdivision (a)(3)(A) does the same for misdemeanors and infractions, with one number changed. The new period is 30 days from the date of withdrawal, and that is true whether your client is in custody or not.

That last point catches people. The original misdemeanor period is 30 days in custody and 45 days out. On withdrawal of a general waiver, subdivision (a)(3)(A) gives everybody 30. If you are calendaring 45 days out from the withdrawal for an out-of-custody client, your last day is off by two weeks in the wrong direction.

The number is not the judge’s to pick

The word “restart” does something misleading in the question. Nothing about the judge’s ruling starts the clock. The withdrawal starts it, by operation of the statute, on the day it happens.

What the court keeps is the date inside the window and the power to find good cause to go past it. A court that sets trial on day 74 after a felony withdrawal has not restarted anything. It has continued the case past the statutory last day, which is only lawful on a good cause finding. Frame it that way in the motion. A judge who believes they are exercising calendar discretion is much easier to move once the record shows they are actually granting a continuance nobody asked for.

The date lands at the back of the window

Here is what actually happens, and the statute does not tell you. Courts set the new trial date near the end of the window rather than the front. Capacity is limited across California, every department is impacted, and a felony withdrawal realistically produces a date in the high fifties, not day twenty. Custody helps at the margin. It does not beat capacity. Say that to the client before they ask you to pull the waiver, because a client who hears “sixty days” and pictures three weeks will decide you did nothing.

What withdrawal buys is not speed by itself. It is that a clock exists at all, with a last day and a dismissal remedy attached to it. Under a general waiver a case can drift for a year and section 1382 has nothing to say about it. After the withdrawal there is a date, an outer limit, and a statute reading “shall order the action to be dismissed” if the People miss it. Often the date comes sooner than the case was going to move on its own. Always it comes with a deadline, and the deadline is the leverage.

No ten day grace period, and this is the part that gets missed

The specific waiver and the general waiver are different machines, and the difference is ten days.

Under a limited waiver, where the defendant requests or consents to a trial date beyond the statutory period without entering a general waiver, subdivisions (a)(2)(B) and (a)(3)(B) say the defendant “shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” The People get the date plus ten. Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774 and Barsamyan v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2008) 44 Cal.4th 960 fix that ten day period to the last date the defendant consented to.

After the withdrawal of a general waiver, no such period exists. Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269 says it in one line: “There is no 10-day ‘grace period’ following expiration of the 30-day time period to bring a defendant to trial under that section.” Day 60 in a felony and day 30 in a misdemeanor is the true last day, not the front end of a grace period.

People v. Superior Court (Arnold) (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 923 explains why the Legislature built it this way. The 1991 amendment that created the general waiver was meant to give the parties more preparation time than the ten day grace period allowed, which is to say a full 60 days from withdrawal instead of a date plus ten. The extra time is in the length of the period, not in a tail hung on the end of it.

Open court, and whatever your court means by proper notice

Two requirements, both in the text. The withdrawal happens in open court, and it happens after proper notice to all parties.

The open court requirement arrived in 2009. Before that, Arias v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 had held that a defendant could withdraw by filing a paper titled Withdrawal of General Time Waiver and serving the People, with no appearance. The Legislature closed that, on the stated concern that a written withdrawal sitting in a file might not reach a prosecutor carrying a large caseload until the period was nearly gone.

“Proper notice” was left undefined on purpose. Daws v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 81 held that trial courts have inherent authority to decide what it means, by local rule or as a matter of courtroom practice, and upheld a two day written notice requirement as consistent with the speedy trial right. Daws also acknowledged that a court may keep taking same day oral notice where that is the accepted local practice.

So this is where the statewide answer runs out. How much notice your withdrawal needs is a local question, and it is often courtroom practice rather than a published rule, which means you cannot look it up. Ask the clerk in the department. If the department wants two days, calendar the notice as its own event, not just the withdrawal. A withdrawal rejected for short notice is a withdrawal that started no clock.

Good cause can still move it, and what does not count

Subdivision (a) is a command with one exception. The court “shall order the action to be dismissed” unless good cause to the contrary is shown. Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817 notes that good cause carries the same meaning under section 1382 and section 1050.

People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533 gives the framework: the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, the length of the delay, and the prejudice the delay is likely to cause either side, weighed against the whole record. Trial courts get broad discretion and review is for abuse of discretion, which is why the fight is almost always about how the reason gets characterized rather than about the standard.

The reasons that fail are worth memorizing, because they are the reasons courts actually give. Court congestion, an unavailable judge or courtroom, and calendar management policies are not good cause. People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131. People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 holds that the state cannot use the obligations appointed counsel owes other clients to excuse a speedy trial denial when the delay traces to chronic understaffing.

The newest case in that line is four months old. Nuanmanee v. Superior Court (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 718 held that a court’s administrative policy of not summoning jurors on Mondays was not good cause to continue a misdemeanor trial past the statutory period over the defendant’s objection. The policy answered a chronic administrative problem rather than anything the defendant did or any one time event, and steps could have been taken to try the case before the deadline. If the reason the courtroom cannot try your case on the last day is a standing policy rather than an accident, that is your argument.

Read more: the section 1050 procedure, and how to make the record

Section 1050 is the mechanism, and it is where continuances get won and lost on paper rather than on the merits.

• Subdivision (b): written notice filed and served on all parties at least two court days before the hearing sought to be continued, with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing the continuance is necessary.
• Subdivision (c): a party who does not comply may still move, but the court may impose sanctions where good cause for the noncompliance is not shown.
• Subdivision (d): the court holds a hearing on whether good cause exists and puts its findings in the record.
• Subdivision (e): “Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.” Neither the convenience of the parties nor a stipulation is good cause in and of itself. That sentence is the one to read out loud when both sides have agreed to a date past the last day.
• Subdivision (i): the court states on the record the facts proved that justify the length of the continuance. Ask for that expressly. A continuance granted with no stated length justification is the record you want on a writ.
• Subdivision (l): the section “is directory only and does not mandate dismissal of an action.” Section 1382 is what mandates dismissal. Do not let a good cause fight collapse into a section 1050 fight.

Two more pieces. Section 1050.1 supplies good cause in a multi-defendant case: where two defendants are jointly charged and the court continues one for good cause, that is good cause to continue the other for a reasonable period to permit a joint trial. And section 1050, subdivision (j) requires the court to notify the Chair of the Judicial Council immediately whenever it appears the court may be required, because of the condition of its calendar, to dismiss under section 1382. Ask whether that notification went out. If the court is telling you its calendar is the problem, the statute says somebody upstairs is supposed to hear about it.

Brought to trial on the last day

Getting called at 4:15 on day 60 is not being brought to trial. Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772 sets the standard: the case is called for trial by a judge who is normally available and ready to try it to conclusion, the court has committed its resources, the parties are ready, and a panel of prospective jurors has been summoned and sworn. A jury impaneled to beat the statute, where the court is not actually ready to try the case, does not count.

Nuanmanee applied Rhinehart to the situation you will actually see. The court heard motions in limine and discussed jury instructions on the last day, could not empanel a jury, and that was not a trial.

If the last day lands on a weekend or a court holiday, the period runs to the next court day.

What dismissal costs the People

Less than defense lawyers hope in a felony, and more than prosecutors expect in a misdemeanor.

Section 1387, subdivision (a) is one long sentence and the operative clause is easy to misread. A termination order bars another prosecution for the same offense “if it is a felony or if it is a misdemeanor charged together with a felony and the action has been previously terminated,” or “if it is a misdemeanor not charged together with a felony.” So a first section 1382 dismissal of a felony is not a bar. The People refile. The second one ends it, and section 1387.1 confirms that reading from the other direction by giving the prosecution one more chance on a violent felony “where the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in Section 1387,” and only where a prior dismissal was due solely to excusable neglect.

A misdemeanor not charged with a felony is barred on the first dismissal. That asymmetry is the reason the 30 day period in a misdemeanor is worth litigating hard, and it also supplies the prejudice you need if the case goes up after a conviction. Had the dismissal been granted when it should have been, there would have been no refiling and no trial.

Read more: the statutory text, subdivision by subdivision

Penal Code section 1382, the parts that matter here.

• (a), opening. “The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed in the following cases.”
• (a)(2). Felony. Trial within 60 days of arraignment on an indictment or information, with separate periods keyed to a mistrial, an order granting a new trial, a remittitur, or a writ or order in effect granting a new trial, and 90 days where the district attorney resubmits for a preliminary examination after an appeal or writ reversing a conviction on a plea.
• (a)(2)(A). The general waiver. It “entitles the superior court to set or continue a trial date without the sanction of dismissal should the case fail to proceed on the date set for trial.” Withdrawal in open court after proper notice, then 60 days from the withdrawal date, then a trial date “shall be set” with notice to all parties. And this sentence, which decides which subparagraph you are in: “If a general time waiver is not expressly entered, subparagraph (B) shall apply.”
• (a)(2)(B). The limited waiver. Trial “on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.”
• (a)(2), closing paragraph. No motion by the defendant to vacate the trial date and set an earlier one, absent notice to all parties and a good cause finding.
• (a)(3). Misdemeanor and infraction. 30 days after arraignment or plea, whichever is later, if in custody at that time; 45 days in all other cases.
• (a)(3)(A) and (B). The same two waiver machines, with 30 days from withdrawal of a general waiver and the same date plus 10 for a limited waiver.
• (a)(3)(C). The misdemeanor defendant who fails to appear and gets a bench warrant is deemed arraigned on the date of the later arraignment on the warrant or submission to the court. The clock starts over there too, and not in your client’s favor.
• (b). Felony failure to appear, bench warrant issued: 60 days after the defendant next appears in superior court, unless a trial date had already been set beyond that period.
• (c). An unrepresented defendant is not deemed to have consented to a trial date unless the court explained the section and the effect of consent.

All of the above was pulled from the current section text, current as of January 1, 2026.

Checklist before you pull the waiver

1. Confirm which waiver you are actually holding. A general waiver on the minutes, or a consent to a date certain. The ten days turns on this and nothing else does.
2. Count the new period from the withdrawal date. 60 days felony, 30 days misdemeanor, in or out of custody. Not 45.
3. Set the client’s expectation before you stand up. The date will land near the end of the window, not the front, and custody will not change that much. What they are buying is a last day, not a fast trial.
4. Find out what proper notice means in that department before the morning you plan to stand up, and give the notice separately from the withdrawal.
5. Get the trial date set on the record that day, along with the last day, and read it back. The statute makes the setting mandatory, and the minute order is what you will be arguing from later.
6. Object on the record to any continuance past the last day, personally by the client where counsel’s other obligations are the only reason, and make the court state the facts supporting good cause and the length.
7. Move to dismiss, then writ it. Prejudice is not required pretrial and it is required later.

This article discusses California law as of August 2026. It is general information for other lawyers, not legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is created by reading it. Statutes, local rules and courtroom practice change, and the notice practice for withdrawing a time waiver varies from court to court.

Last reviewed: August 2026.